In other legal orders, introductory sections of ordinary legal acts frequently refer to the normative or constitutional basis of the particular act in superior legal norms, or they give reasons for or justify that act of legislation. Such references and justifi cations preceding the operative part of a law are known from the EU regulations or directives according to art. 296 TFEU 3 and they are commonly applied, e.g. in Spain, in the UK and the USA. In Germany, if the legislator deems it appropriate to give reasons for or justify his particular act of legislation, one ore more articles will be included in the operative part of the law, usually in an introductory section, holding so-called "Leitvorschriften", i.e. guiding rules. And even in the few cases where a preamble has preceded a legal act in German legislation since 1949, the opera tive articles of that act contained additional guiding rules, stating the purpose of legislating or containing defi nitions.
B) Preambles in German legislation
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the legislator's general dislike of proems to normative acts may be explained with the preceding practice of the Third Reich and the practice of the German Democratic Republic and, possibly, also with an aversion to the legislation of the authori ties of the Allied Forces occupying Germany, Allied directives frequently including detailed introductory sections on the purpose and scope of a particular act. In the Third Reich and, to some extent, also in the German Democratic Republic, preambles to laws were quite a costumary way of informing the public of the ideological basis for and, thus, a manner to determine the content of a normative rule, and they were sometimes of more importance for the interpretation of a concrete act of legislation than the wording of the bill itself. As one author said in 1988, many legal acts passed under National Socialism, were literally opposed with their preambles. Such preambles were sometimes longer than the operative sections and they were deemed to be more closely related to real life and considered as more immediate and, therefore, less questionable manifestations of the will of the legislator. Thus, one could get the impression that the proems were intended to undermine the positive normative rules following. 4 In spite of the mentioned general dislike of preambles, in exceptional cases, the German legislator, when passing a legal act, still felt it appropriate to make some delcaratory statement and include it by way of an introductory statement, even after 1949. Thus, in the case of the Lastenausgleichsgesetz (Equalisation of Burdens Act) of August 14, 1952 , the preamble contained an acknowledgement of the special sufferings of the ethnic German expellees from the East with, however, no practical re levance for the system of equalization of burdens. The preamble was merely meant to be a po litical statement and it was not a substitute for those "Leitvorschriften", i.e. guiding rules in the fi rst section of the law, especially art. 1, stating the "goals" of the compensatory payments to individuals for losses during and after World War II and the further articles containing defi nitions.
When, after World War II, the Austrian State regained its independence from the Germany, the authorities of Western Germany and Austria disagreed on the question, if and at what moment legal personality and capa city of Austria had been restored and whether Austrians had lost German ci tizenship as of April 26, 1945, or at some later date, or not at all. When re gulating the loss of German citizenship by Austrians in 1956, the German legislator deemed it appropriate to state the offi cial German legal point of view concerning the fate of the Austrian State in 1938 in a preamble to that act. According to that preamble the German Act of 1938 on Re unifi cation of Austria and Germany had been valid at the time it was en acted, and it had only ceased to be in force at the end of World War II. Thus, Germany explicitly disagreed with the Austrian position, claiming that the law declaring the "Anschluß" had been void ab initio.
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C) The Constitutional Preamble
While ordinary laws generally were passed without preambles in the Federal Re public of Germany after 1949, the federal Basic Law of 1949, like the Wei mar Constitution of 1919, contained a preamble-as do, according to an Austrian scholar, 143 out of 191 contemporary constitutions worldwide. 6 The original preamble to the Grundgesetz had the following wording: "The German People in the Laender Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, conscious of its responsibility before God and Men, animated by the resolve to preserve its national and political unity and to serve the peace of the World as an equal partner in a united Europe, desiring to give a new order to political life for a trans itional period, has enacted, by virtue of its constituent power, this Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.
It has also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied. The entire German people is called on to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany."
After World War I, in the Case of the 1919 Constitution, it was the general view that the preamble contained only some delcaratory remarks concerning free dom, justice, peace and progress. As Hermann von Mangoldt has stressed in his monograph explaining the Basic Law, 7 "under the pre sent circumstances", i.e. the situation of the year 1949, the signifi cance of the introductory remarks to the Basic Law must be viewed quite differently, having regard to certain aspects of the history of origin of the Grundgesetz (von Mangoldt was the leading public law expert among the CDU-members of the Parliamentary Council, whose members, from September 1, 1948, to May 8, 1949, were drafting the Grundgesetz basing themselves on proposals of the Council of Experts convened in Herrenchimsee in August 1948).
The legal moment of those introductory remarks, i. e. of the preamble to the Grundgesetz, could, of course, not be predicted when passing the Basic Law in 1949. One reason is the unforeseeable future state of Germany. Another aspect should be mentioned, too: According to the German Grundgesetz, the Federal Constitutional Court was and still is to be the Court of last (and in most cases also of fi rst) instance in all questions concerning the authentic interpretation of the Grundgesetz and of ju diciary review, and it is considered by some authors to be the equivalent of a permanent constitutional assembly. However, it cannot be doubted that the drafters of the preamble to the Basic Law in the Bonn Parliamentary Council, wanted their constitution to be read and interpreted subject to certain provisos, based on the special circumstances of post-war Germany, which should be included in a preamble.
D. The Situation of 1949 mirrowing in the Preamble to the Grundgesetz
In 1948/49, it was the Western Allied Powers, who suggested to the Laender of the American, British and French zones of occupation to form a federal West German State. Its constitution should be drafted by a con stituent assembly elected by the people in the several Laender and it should then be ratifi ed by the Military Governors. Finally, it was to be submitted to popular vote and it was supposed to enter into force upon being accepted by a simple, though not qualifi ed, majority of voters in at least two-thirds of the Laender.
The offer of the Western Allies to support the foundation of a West German Federation was considered to be a mixed blessing by the Laender. The Minister-Presidents, i.e. the heads of Laender governments, got into a state of confl ict: There was the real danger that a State limited to the Western Zones of occupied Germany would further deepen the division between East and West. The Laender Prime Ministers accepted the offer of the Western allies albeit only with important reservations. The federal State to be established by the Laender in the Western Zones of Germany should be set up as a transitory entity and it should cease to exist upon Ger many regaining its unity. Therefore, the assembly drafting the Con stitution of that provisional State was not to be a constituent assembly elected by the people at large, but it was rather conceived as a Parliamentary Council, whose members were to be elected by the parliaments of the several Laender. The con stitutional draft presented by that Parliamentary Council should not be submitted to popular vote as suggested by the Allied Powers; instead of being accepted by the people at large it should by ratifi ed by a qualifi ed majority of the Parliaments of the Laender involved in the drafting pro cess. And to make it clear that the new fundamental law of the provisional fe deral State to be established was supposed to be provisional or transitional as well, that act was to be called Basic Law (Grundgesetz) instead of Constitution (Verfassung). In the beginning of the drafting process it was planned to conceive the Basic Law merely as an organisational statute of an occupied country. The Parliamentary Council wanted the preamble to the Basic Law, among others, to mirror the special circumstances of occupation, and the Council had therefore intended to adopt the following reference in the preamble to the limitations imposed upon the independence of the Federal Republic by the occupying powers: "The occupation of Germany by foreign powers has subjected the exercise of the right [to the free formation of national life] to severe limitations."
At a later stage, the General Drafting Committe of the Parliamentary Council, however, thought that a preamble stressing the restrictions to sovereignty caused by the Allied occupation would sound too much like resignation, and, fi nally, they avoided any mention in the Basic Law of the occupation regime and the legal relationship of the German lawmaker to it. The historical circumstances of 1948/49 were, rather on the contrary, even veiled by the fi nal draft of the pre amble: Though the members of the Council drafting the Grundgesetz were neither chosen by immediate popular election nor did they submit the Grundgesetz to a popular referendum, the preamble stated that "the German People in the [enumerated] Laender, has enacted, by virtue of its constituent power, this Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany." When the drafting process of the Basic Law was completed, the fundamental law for Federal Germany was, there fore, no longer considered as just an organisational statute of an occupied country. It had, rather, in the Words of the Constitutional Court, "ultimately assumed the guise of the constitutional charter of a sovereign state". 8 With respect to the unforeseeable future, the Parliamentary Council had been very fortunate to drop its complaints for the lack of sovereignty and not to stress in the preamble to the Basic Law that, in 1949, the Parliamentary Council lacked self-determination and, therefore, could not pass a con stitution proper. In 1990, those voices that were stressing the provisional cha racter of the Grundgesetz of 1949 by referring to the preamble, and, upon reunifi cation, were therefore pleading for its replacement by a genuine constitution for the whole of Germany, could easily be ignored. Upon reunifi cation of the divided State of Germany in 1990, it would have been, however, much more diffi cult to refrain from drafting a genuine new constitution, had there been any ex plicit reservation in the original draft of the Grundgesetz, as to the lack of of German sovereignty in 1949.
Besides the dropped proviso concerning the lack of sovereignty of the entity to be called Federal Republic of Germany, the Parliamentary Coun cil, when drafting the Grundgesetz, wanted several provisos to be in cluded in its preamble. According to von Mangoldt 9 they were a) the right of the German people to self-determination, b) German unity, c) the enforced territorial limitation of the order to be established to only one part of Germany, i.e. Western Germany, d) the invitation of other, still excluded, parts of Germany to accede to the newly formed State, e) the name of the newly formed entity and f) its relationship to the German Reich, i.e. the question of continuity or State succession, then, under g), the provisional character of the fundamental Law to be passed, and, fi nally, h) the dropped statement on the lack of sovereignty. Except for the last point, all provisos had been somehow referred to in the Titel of or in the preamble to the Basic Law in 1949.
Already the title "Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland" ("Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany") was meant to be an allusion to the last three provisos and the legal viewpoint of the majority of the members of the Council. The fi rst part, "Federal Republic", replacing "Reich", was to indicate some distance from the Reich, especially the "Third Reich". That "Federal Republic" was used as an attributive noun to qualify Germany, was, of course, also meant as a plea for German unity. But calling the new State "Germany" should fi rst of all demonstrate the identity of the Federal Republic with the Reich. Not only the offi cial name of the Federal Republic, but also the statements in the preamble, accord ing to which the "the German People [...] has enacted, by virtue of its constituent power, this Basic Law" and that the "German People" was "animated by the resolve to preserve its national and political unity", re ferred to the identity of the Federal Republic with the German Reich that was supposed to be "preserved". Besides calling the constitution "Basic Law", the pre amble expressed the desire for a "new order to political life for a trans itional period".
The references to the German people and to national and political unity alluded also to three underlying aspects of the situation of divided post-war Germany, which, according to von Mangoldt, had to be taken into account by the preamble to the Grundgesetz. These aspects were the question of German unity, then, the enforced territorial partition, allowing the new order to be estab lished only in the Western parts of Germany, and, fi nally, the invitation of other, still excluded, parts of Germany to accede to the newly formed State. The 2nd sentence of the preamble, therefore, declared that the Ger man people, by enacting the Basic Law, "has also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied". And the 3rd sentence of the preamble was not only a mere declaration, but it called upon "the entire German people [...] to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany". Though the preamble was silent on and avoided any hint at the infringements of the occupation, this last sentence explicitly adverted to the right of the German people to self-determination as a precondition for the German people to become, as the preamble declared in its fi rst sentence, "an equal partner in a united Europe". Thus, the authors of the Grundgesetz were demanding for the German State equal treatment and nondiscrimination according to the general principles of international law.
E. The Legal Relevance of the Preamble
The reach of any legal impact of the original preamble could, of course, not be predicted at the time of the passing of the Basic Law in 1949. As mentioned before, it was up to the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court to ascribe material import to the preamble. 10 And until 1990, the only normative directive read into that preamble by the supreme constitutional judges, was the precept of reunifi cation of Germany. It was their 1957 judgment ordering the dissolution of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and thereby forbidding any further ac tivities of the KPD, which is considered to have been the guiding decision concerning the legally binding commitment of all German State organs to reunifi cation.
When the Communist Party was to be dissolved, because it was said to oppose and fi ght the free democratic basis order established under the Grundgesetz, the attorneys defending the party argued that dissolution of the KPD would impede reunifi cation and would, therefore, violate the Basic Law. In the fi rst headnote of its dissolution order of August 17, 1956 , the Court confi rmed that the preamble to the Basic Law, though of special political importance, had also legal implications for the State organs. All State organs of the Fe deral Republic were obliged to aspire "with all strength" German unity and to refrain from actions impeding or making impossible reunifi cation. The dissolution of the KPD was therefore decreed under the resolutory con dition of all-German elections, in the case of which a Communist party would be allowed to run again.
The precept of reunifi cation played a role again in the case con cerning the Basic Treaty of December 21, 1972 between the Federal Repulic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic initiated by Bavaria. Only after its entry into force, on July 31, 1973, the Court gave an interpretation of that treaty in the light of the reunifi cation precept of the preamble. The treaty was qualifi ed as an inter se agreement between to segments of Germany that were separated from each other not by an international border but by a border similar to that be tween to West German Laender. If Karlsruhe had handed down that opinion, binding on the State organs of the Federal Re public, before ratifi cation documents had been exchanged between Bonn and East Berlin, the German Democratic Republic would probably have stopped the exchange pro cedures. Therefore, the German Constitutional Court did not even grant an injunction demanded by Bavaria, but decided ex post, on July 31, 1973.
Except for the precept of reunifi cation with its very limited infl uence on practical politics, the legal signifi cance of the old preamble can be ne glected. But the hazards of interpretation might have led to quite some problems in 1990. At that time a serious discussion took place, as to whether Germany could continue with a Basic Law intended to be provisional. In this connection, along with its preamble, the fi nal article of the old constitution could also be mentioned, where it said that "This Basic Law shall cease to be inforce on the day on which a Constitution adopted by the free decision of the Ger man people comes into force." Read in conjunction with the desire ex pressed in the preamble "to give a new order to political life for a trans itional period", the Constitutional Court could have possibly disagreed with the perpetu ation of the Basic Law by transforming it into a regular constitution.
In the end, however, the provisos concerning the transitional and provisional character, which were inserted into the premable of the Grundgesetz in 1949, did not prevent the German legislator to extend the ter ritorial scope of the original Basic Law to the former German Democratic Republic as of October 3, 1990.
F. The New Preamble of 1990
Upon reunifi cation, some provisions of the Basic Law became out of date, however, and internationally improper. According to the "Two-plus-Four" Treaty of September 12, 1990 , terminating the Allied rights and responsibilities for Germany, the existing outer frontiers of the two German States were to be fi nal, and Germany under took not to raise any further territorial claims. Therefore, art. 23 of the Basic Law of 1949, allowing ad mission of "other parts of Germany" to the territorial scope of the Basic Law, had to be cancelled. Concerning the preamble, the pre sent order could no longer be conceived as to be meant for a transitional period of time only. According to the "Two-plus-Four" Treaty, there were also no longer any "Germans to whom participation was denied". The new pre amble therefore reads:
"Conscious of its responsibility before God and Men, Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constitutent power, have adopted this Basic Law.
Germans in the Laender of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bran denburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, NorthrhineWestphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination. This Basic Law thus applies to the entire German people."
We have already mentioned that, if at all, the preamble of 1990 was only to a lesser extent intended to point to the future than the original preamble of 1949. Its main importance lies in the delcaratory remarks concerning the territorial saturation of the German State after reuni fi cation and concerning the end of the transitional period.
Still, in a decision of 2009, the German Constitutional Court referred to the "determination to pro mote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe". Proclaimed in the preamble to the Basic Law. In itself, that statement does, of course, not stipulate any obligations for the State organs taking part in interna tional efforts to develop a closer European Union, but as the Court held on June 30, 2009, in the decision concerning the Lisbon Treaty, the pre amble emphasises the "moral basis of responsible self-determination" and, on the other hand, the "willingness to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe".
11 This willingness becomes operational only, if read in con junction with the operative clauses of the Basic Law on integration (arts 23, 24, 26). It is these clauses that lend empowerment to the declaration of willingness, declared in the preamble. 12 Therefore, it is from art. 23.1 of the Basic Law "and its preamble" that follows the "constitutional mandate to realise a united Europe". 13 Needless to say that the Court could have reached its conlusions as well without any reference to the "determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe" as declared by the preamble.
G. "Conscious of its responsibility before God ..."-On the reference to God in the Grundgesetz "Conscious of its responsibility before God and Men" (or mankind?) is the initial phrase, one might say the preamble to the preamble, of both the 1949 and the 1990 versions of the introduction to the Basic Law. The preamble to the Weimar Constitution did not refer to God, 14 and also the Herrenchimsee proposal of August 1948 did not yet containing any nominatio dei. 15 It was only at a late stage of its drafting by the Parliamentary Council that the quoted initial phrase of the Grundgesetz was fi rst included in the preamble. There, "God and Men" as two cumulative points of reference for the re claimed responsibility of the legis lator of the Grundgesetz, were placed next to each other. Technically speaking, the introductory phrase of the preamble does not imply an "invocatio dei", but a "nominatio dei", a mere reference to God. The juxtaposition of God and Men minimizes, of course, the plausibility of any assertion of a specifi c religious connotation of the reference to God. It is hardly justi fi able or arguable, at least as far as the original version of 1949 is con cerned, to read more into the two references, made simultaneously and equally, to God and to Men, than a mere demonstration of awareness of the historic situation that led to the drafting of the new Basic Law and a change of consciousness due to the ex periences, the German people had made during the years of National So cialism. Therefore, and considering the strict religious and ideological neutrality decreed by several operative articles of the Basic Law (fi rst, by art. 4 on religious freedom, then, by art. 3 paragr. 3 and art. 33 paragr. 3, explicitly forbidding discrimination for religious or ideological reasons, and, fi nally, also by art. 140 with regard to re ligious association), most authorities on the Grundgesetz will agree that the reference to God in the preamble has "no legal connotation". 16 Still, authors, of course, differ in their interpretations of the invo cation of "God" in the preamble, and, notwithstanding the juxtaposition of God and Men, the historic circumstances, and the operative clauses in the Grundgesetz on strict religious neu trality, some constitutional lawyers see it differently. As late as 2009, one author commenting on the preamble wrote that the invocation of God, though not de creeing a State religion, was meant to refer to the threefold God of Chri stianity. 17 The author differentiates between the responsibility before God and that before Men, devoting fi ve times more space to his re marks on God than to those on Man. That interpretation would bring the God of the German preamble close to that of the Irish and Greek consti tutions, the main difference beeing that Germany, of course, has no State Religion, the lack of a State religion beinig explicitly confi rmed by art. 140 of the Basic Law.
The predominant view on the preamble, therefore, minimizes the importance of God. In the already quoted monograph of von Mangoldt on the Basic Law any reference to the invocation of God is missing. Von Mangoldt, himself a Christian Democrat, was commenting every other phrase of the preamble, also stressing differences between the Weimar and the Bonn preambles, but he did not even mention the introductory phrase of the Bonn preamble of 1949 concerning the responsibility before God and Men, al though, in this point, the Weimar preamble was quite different. In 1991, Dieter Hömig, then member of the Federal Administrative Court, dropped only one sentence on the reference to God, when commenting the preamble of the Basic Law. He wrote that nothing could be drawn from the reference to God and Men but an indication to the "ideological state of the legislators" in 1949. 18 In 2010, the author, after having served on the bench of the Karlsruhe Constitu tional Court, is less harsh, without, however, changing his opinion substantially. Ac cording to the 2010 edition of his comment, the reference to God still does not contain any religious or ideological message in the stricter sense. In his view, stressing the responsibility before God an Men, is tanta mount to a re jection of all forms of totalitarianism and to confessing a minimum stan dard of pre-set values. 19 Hömig's conception of the introductory clause of the preamble seems to be the prevailing understanding of it. That his interpretation is correct, can be seen from the limited or rather non-existing practical relevance of the "nominatio dei" in constitutional jurisdiction. It has not been referred to by the German Constitutional Court, especially in the recent cases concerning religious instruction in East Germany. It has also not been discussed, when the Court had to decide on the question of shop closing hours, where the special protection of Sun days and religious holi days by the Basic Law was affi rmed by the Court, or in the case concer ning removal of crucifi xes from class-rooms. If the appelants in a constitutional com plaint (e.g. concerning religious instruction in Bran denburg) argue with the invocation of God in the preamble, the Court dismisses that argument for procedural reasons without referring at all to the invocation in the merits, because no en forceable rights can be drawn by appellants of a constitutional complaint out of the preamble.
As to the several Laender of the Federal Republic of Germany, nine out of the 16 constitutions of the Laender do not refer to God in their preambles at all 20 (the Constitutions of Saarland and of Schleswig-Holstein do not contain preambles at all)-already before reunifi cation, it was seven out of eleven constitutions, among them the Saarland: Contrary to the French conception of secularism, the constitu tion introduced in the territory of Saarland, when it was under French control after World War II, contained a preamble with a reference to God. 21 Upon reintegration into the Federal Republic of Germany, in 1957, the preamble was removed. On the other hand, the provisional Constitution of Lower Saxony of 1951 and the Constitution of 1993 did not contain a pre amble. But in 1994 the representative organs of the Protestants, the Catholics, and of the Jews in Lower Saxony were demanding the inclusion of God into the new Constitution, and they succeeded in collecting 120 000 signatures in a po pular initiative. Thereupon, the Parliament of Lower Sa xony amended the Constitution. An introductory clause, similar to the fi rst part of the prologue to the Grundgesetz, was adopted, proclaiming that "The people of Lower Saxony, con scious of its re sponsibility before God and Men, has, by their representatives, enacted the following Constitution". Any invocation of God seems to be of little relevance, however, and moderate as well as orthodox theologians even fi nd it presumptious to have God invoked in a se cular constitution. In the fedarated State of Branden burg, the two Christian Churches themselves agreed on the omission of God from the new constitution. 22 In 1949, it was, among others, the prominent Protestant Bishop of Berlin, Otto Dibelius, who rejected any reference to God in the Grundgesetz. 23 In 1990, Wolfgang Ullmann, an outstanding Protestant cleric and East German dissident, deputy of the last Parliament of the German Democratic Republic and, after reunifi cation, till his death in 2004, member of the Bundestag and the European Parliament for the Green Party, had sugge sted to completely drop God from the preamble of the Federal Basic Law. 24 Therefore, not only the lack of legal signifi cance should make legislators refrain from referring to God in State Constitutions.
With regard to the missing ideological or reli gious homogeneity, in Germany and its Laender as well as in most of the other Euro pean States, the invocation of God might not prove to be fateful or momentous, but it has created and will create problems, e.g. at present, in Germany, with its Muslim minority. Here, Christian Wulff, now the German President, had appointed the fi rst Muslim State Minister, when he was still head of government of Lower Saxony. When the nominee took her offi cial oath, adding, "so help me God", she was asked what invoking God meant in her case, and she told an astonished audience that she was invoking Allah.
Following the much disputed remarks on integration in the speech held by the German President, Christian Wulff, on October 3, 2010, the discussion on whether there are religious values underlying the order of the Grundgesetz, has become more heated. Only ten days after that controversial speech, on October 13, 2010, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, a protestant scholar at the Munich University, internationally of great academic repute and of high theological standing, warned of the consequences of "babtizing" the Grundgesetz. 25 According to Graf, it would be utterly wrong to assert that the Grundgesetz is based on a "Christian-Jewish heritage", the German constitution being the result of enlightened thought. And he cautioned against qualifying or modifying the difference between rights and religion and between rights and morals.
Thus, it seems that respect and esteem for God should make us hesitate to invoke Him carelessly in the se cular and profane context of any secular Basic Law or Constitution. 
